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Abstract
We propose and validate a task to induce acute socio-evaluative stress in the laboratory. The task features
performance-based pay and simultaneously creates a treatment and a control group. Employing this task, 
we study the influence of acute socio-evaluative stress on the propensity to tell a selfish black lie and to 
trust messages that can comprise lies. We find that stress significantly reduces the probability to lie at the 
extensive margin, while it does not influence the intensive margin of lying. Furthermore, we find evidence 
that socio-evaluative stress significantly reduces the willingness to trust messages that may contain large 
lies.
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11. Introduction
For many people, lying is costly (Abeler et al. 2014, Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013, Gneezy 2005).
Yet, lying is omnipresent in the private and the professional domain. Selfish black lies, i.e. deceiving as-
sertions that benefit the liar yet harm the receiver (Erat and Gneezy 2012), especially bear the potential of 
causing direct economics losses. However, additional, indirect, economic losses may also arise as sensing 
the possibility of falling victim to a lie may have adverse effects on the propensity to trust and follow 
messages. This may in turn erode the fundaments of trust-based interactions, even leading to lost business 
opportunities. 
Since selfish black lies can cause efficiency losses, economists have set a focus on studying determinants 
of lying behavior. So far, characteristics of economic agents (e.g. gender or lying types1) and their contrac-
tual relations (e.g. incentives for lying2) have stood in the center of the analysis. However, the context in 
which decisions are made may also have a strong impact on behavior. In this study, we focus on acute 
socio-evaluative stress as the decision-making context. This type of stress is a short-term psychological
stress reaction caused by the possibility that another party may judge the decision maker’s abilities or ac-
tions negatively (Dickerson and Kemeny 2004). Many people are confronted with stressful situations in
which their intelligence or competence is evaluated by others. For instance, these could be exams, (job) 
interviews, public speeches or presentations. The choices made in or right after these situations, e.g. to be 
honest or to lie, can crucially influence political, economic, or business outcomes. 
In fact, stress at the workplace has been shown to adversely influence business outcomes even if it occurs 
in short bouts, i.e. when stress is acute and not chronic (Hassard et al. 2014, Hoel 2001). When measured, 
the cost of stress in the workplace usually accounts for an increase in sickness absenteeism, increased turn-
over rates and reduced productivity. However, these calculations do not control for the impact stress has on 
the decision quality. Workplace related stress was found to have increased over the last years (Chandola
2010, Hyde 2017) 3. Therefore, the urge to study interactions of acute stress, the willingness to tell selfish 
black lies, and the willingness to trust in situations with lying opportunities should not be neglected.
1 Overall, results on gender differences in lying are mixed. While Dreber and Johannesson (2008) and Erat and Gneezy (2012) find that men are 
significantly more likely than women to tell a selfish black lie, Childs (2012) and Gylfason et al. (2013) find no gender differences in lying. Many 
papers additionally classify people according to their propensity to lie, i.e. into lying types (e.g. Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) or Hurkens 
and Kartik (2009).
2 Kajackaite and Gneezy (2017) show that lying behavior is sensitive to incentives. Conrads et al. (2013) show that lying increases under team 
incentives because individual responsibilities are unclear. Kocher et al. (2017) show that this effect increases when subjects are allowed to com-
municate. Cappelen et al. (2013) show that lying decreases if the content of the message is personal.
3 Unfortunately, these studies do not differentiate between the type of stressor or acute and chronic stress. Nevertheless, they report increases in 
stressors connected to acute stress (e.g. inter-personal conflict or work demands) as well as increases in adverse health outcomes (e.g. high blood 
pressure and cardiovascular risk) associated with episodes of acute stress.
2While studying stress, selfish black lies, or trust may already be difficult in the field, accurately measuring 
their interaction will be even more challenging. We therefore take our research questions to the controlled 
setting of a laboratory. The laboratory experiment allows us to controllably induce acute socio-evaluative 
stress in our participants and observe their behavior afterwards. The following chapter introduces the related 
literature. In chapter 3, we explain why the socio-evaluative stress task psychologists frequently employ 
may not be appropriate to use in an economist’s lab. We therefore introduce a novel stress task and show 
that it is successful in creating acute socio-evaluative stress in our treatment group while the control group 
clearly does not show a stress reaction, which we measure with samples of the stress hormone cortisol. 
Subsequently, we employ our task to study the effect of stress on lying and trusting behavior. We use the 
game described by Gneezy et al. (2013) to study the willingness to send selfish black lies and to follow 
messages that can include lies. The lying game involves a first mover who decides on whether and how 
strong to lie to a second mover whose choice it is to decide on whether to follow the information given by 
the first mover. This setup will allow us to derive first results on the extensive and intensive margin of lying 
under acute socio-evaluative stress. Additionally, our results will provide further evidence on trusting be-
havior under acute stress. The lying game is described in more detail in chapter 4, where we also describe 
our results.
2. Related Literature
Socio-evaluative stress is an intensely studied subject in psychology and has been shown to significantly
influence behavior in diverse contexts. Interestingly, this research has mainly focused on influences on pro-
social behavior in the context of non-incentivized moral dilemmas. Youssef et al. (2012) study behavior 
under socio-evaluative stress. They provide evidence that stressed individuals give significantly less utili-
tarian responses (maximization of the wellbeing of the involved players) than the unstressed participants if 
these responses come at the expense of another player. Using anticipatory4 stress, Starcke et al. (2012) 
provide further evidence for this finding. Additionally, Singer et al. (2017) show that exposure to socio-
evaluative stress has a pro-social effect on everyday moral decision-making. This means that stressed indi-
viduals prefer altruistic responses to egoistic ones in moral conflict situations. Although all of these results 
are based on hypothetical decision situations and do not result in payoff consequences for the participants, 
they represent a first approach to the question of how acute socio-evaluative stress influences moral deci-
sion-making. The results are in line with the dual-process theory of moral judgment (Greene et al. 2004) or 
system 1 and system 2 in thinking fast and slow (Kahneman 2011). These theories state that both higher 
cognition and emotional judgement sometimes play a competing role in decision-making. Acute socio-
4 Participants received instructions for a task associated with socio-evaluative stress as well as preparation time but never had to perform the task.
3evaluative stress has been shown to affect both of these channels: The stress hormone cortisol influences
brain regions integral to emotional decision-making (Dedovic, Rexroth et al. 2009, Kern et al. 2008, Ku-
kolja et al. 2008, Pruessner et al. 2008). Furthermore, acute socio-evaluative stress adversely affects work-
ing memory (Kirschbaum et al. 1996, Luethi et al. 2009, Oei et al. 2006), which is a brain system that
temporarily stores information, allows the manipulation of said information, and is important for higher 
cognition (Baddeley 1992). Apparently, stressed individuals rely less on their cognitive judgement when 
making decisions (Shields et al. 2016). Instead, they tend to rely on their first intuition, which points at the 
morally correct choice or leads to the application of behavioral heuristics (Buckert et al. 2017).
Following the results of the previous studies, we expect that participants under acute socio-evaluative 
stress will resort to the morally correct choice of refraining from an obvious lying opportunity. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that our stressed participants send less selfish black lies than the unstressed participants.
The literature most closely related to our study focuses on the influence of time pressure on decision-
making. It should, however, be noted that decision making in our set up is not limited by time pressure. 
Time pressure may work through diverse channels. For instance, it limits the available time to consider 
(payoff) consequences. Participants under time pressure might therefore rely on social heuristics (Rand et 
al. 2014) or their first intuition when making their decisions. Furthermore, some participants might experi-
ence feeling pressured as stressful. Note, however, that Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) show that tasks with 
time pressure do not reliably elicit a significant release of the stress hormone cortisol. Additionally, when
time pressure leads to increases in hormonal responses, the data of Buckert et al. (2017) and Steptoe et al. 
(1993) show that the absolute size of the effect is quite small compared to the effect sizes observed for
socio-evaluative stress (e.g. Dickerson and Kemeny 2004). Thus, one should be careful to conjecture that 
the results provided in the literature on time pressure will automatically apply under socio-evaluative threat.
Capraro (2017), Konrad et al. (2018), and Shalvi et al. (2012) present experimental results for lying under 
time pressure. However, none of the studies measure stress levels. Shalvi et al. (2012) argue that lying is 
the initial automatic intuition of people. Deliberation, i.e. time to think about decision consequences, allows 
people to overcome their automatic self-serving behavioral tendencies. They provide experimental evidence 
showing that under high time pressure, participants lie significantly more than when provided with ample 
time to make their decisions. While Konrad et al. (2018) implement a design in which participants have to 
become aware of the lying opportunity under time pressure, Capraro (2017) ensures that the lying oppor-
tunity is clear to the subjects before they make their decisions to lie or to report truthfully. Konrad et al. 
(2018) show that time pressure has no s effect on misreporting, but decreases the awareness of the 
lying opportunity significantly. Thus, for subjects who are aware of the one-shot lying opportunity, the 
decision to lie does not vary significantly between treatments with and without time pressure. Capraro
(2017) provides contradictory evidence from a small stake experiment and shows that for participants who 
4are aware of the lying opportunity, time pressure decreases lying in one-shot interactions. The author argues 
that the finding is in line with the Social Heuristics Hypothesis (Rand et al. 2014), which claims that peo-
ple’s default strategies correspond to choices that are optimal in their everyday interactions and that have 
been internalized over time.
The literature further provides evidence for the influence of acute socio-evaluative stress on the willing-
ness to trust, which is related to our study. However, the results are mixed. Steinbeis et al. (2015) and von 
Dawans et al. (2012) report the results of trust games performed by participants who underwent a task that 
induces acute socio-evaluative stress. In the trust game, the first mover decides to send some or all of the 
initial monetary endowment to a second mover. In Steinbeis et al. (2015), the money sent is tripled and the 
second mover has to decide how much of the tripled amount he or she wants to send back to the first mover. 
Von Dawans (2012) play a slightly altered version of the game, where the second mover can only decide 
to return half of the amount and keeping the rest or keeping the entire amount and not returning any. In 
these games, the first mover’s decision is interpreted as the decision to trust. In contrast to our experimental 
design, decision-making may underlie different psychological pathways, as the second mover can only reap 
returns higher than the initial endowment if the first mover invested. In the set-up of Steinbeis et al. (2015),
this entails sending a signal of trust (entrusted money) to the second mover. In the game that we report in 
chapter 4, trust can never initiate a reciprocal response by another player. 
Von Dawans et al. (2012) show that stressed individuals who act as first movers in a trust game are more 
pro-social, i.e. more trusting, than the unstressed participants. Steinbeis et al. (2015) argue that this obser-
vation results because the participants go through a group version of the stress task, meaning that the design
creates potential for social affiliation, which might buffer self-preserving reactions following stress, and 
therefore leads to the pro-social pattern of trust. The authors expect a self-preserving reaction, because the 
amygdala shows involvement after the exposure to socio-evaluative stress (Dedovic, Duchesne et al.2009, 
Rodrigues et al. 2009). This brain region is connected to detecting environmental threats and governing 
anxious and defensive reactions (Lang et al. 1998). In that vein, Steinbeis et al. (2015) employ a stress task 
without potential for social affiliation and show that acute socio-evaluative stress leads to decreased levels 
of trust—especially, if the other player is known to be an outgroup member. Since our participants also 
undergo an individual stress task, we follow the evidence of Steinbeis et al. (2015) and hypothesize that our 
treatment group exhibits lower levels of trust than the unstressed control group when it comes to following 
messages that might contain a lie.
Our main findings concerning the decision to send a selfish black lie and to trust messages can be found 
in chapter 4. They show that socio-evaluative threat significantly reduces the probability of sending a selfish
black lie. However if a member of the stressed treatment group decides to lie, socio-evaluative stress does 
not alter the aversion to lying at the intensive margin and the size of the lie remains unchanged. For the 
5decision to follow a message, we do not find significant aggregate behavioral differences between the 
stressed treatment group and the control group. However, we do see that earnings of the players who faced
socio-evaluative threat are significantly reduced as these players follow messages that can potentially con-
tain large lies significantly less often than the control group. We conjecture that socio-evaluative stress
comes at a cost, as all messages in the game lead to positive expected excess payoffs. Participants who 
prefer not to follow messages forgo these earnings and cannot regain them during the remainder of the 
game.
3. The Stress Task
3.1 Experimental Design
Foley and Kirschbaum (2010) show that changes in cortisol best characterize the biological response to 
acute psychosocial stress. Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) report that tasks elicit cortisol responses if they 
are uncontrollable and characterized by socio-evaluative threat, where uncontrollability means that an in-
dividual is not able to influence the outcome of a situation through a behavioral response (Thompson 1981) 
and socio-evaluative threat refers to the risk of being judged negatively. In fact, Gruenewald et al. (2004) 
provide evidence that the component of social evaluation drives cortisol responses in the Trier Social Stress 
Test (TSST, Kirschbaum et. al. 1993). Psychologists frequently employ this test to induce acute socio-
evaluative stress in participants. It has been shown to reliably trigger cortisol responses in both the individ-
ual and the group version of the test (TSST-G, von Dawans et al. 2011). 
Participants in the TSST have to produce a free speech (a 2-minute mock job interview) in front of a 
committee who is wearing white laboratory coats and is trained to withhold verbal and nonverbal feedback. 
The committee is introduced as experts in the evaluation of non-verbal behavior. Participants are further 
told that a video analysis of their performance will be conducted. Therefore, their free speech is videotaped.
However, a performance evaluation is not part of the task and is therefore not carried out. 5
Het et al. (2009) report how to generate a control group for the TSST. The participants are asked to read 
a popular scientific text. Afterwards, they have to read out the text simultaneously and in a low voice. Two 
experimenters are present but are not dressed in lab coats and also do not observe or interrupt the partici-
pants. The control group is told that no performance evaluation will take place. Video cameras are not 
present.
We deliberately avoid the introduction of confederates who serve as the expert panel in the setting as
well as giving the participants incorrect information regarding a performance analysis. Following the argu-
ment of Jamison et al. (2008), we strongly believe that providing participants with incorrect information 
5 Cahlíková and Cingl (2017) present a non-deceptive variant of the TSST that does not control for participants’ performance in the free-speech 
task.
6concerning the experiment or the role of the participants therein may influence future expectations and 
behavior in the lab if participants become aware of the practice.
In our experiment, the participants are divided into two groups of five—the stressed treatment group
(Stress), and the control group (Control). The setup of the lab allowed participants of Stress to be seated in 
a room adjacent to that of participants of Control. Participants of Stress have five minutes to prepare a two-
minute recording, in which they elaborate on their ability to think analytically. This is a skill that is re-
quested in many job descriptions in Germany, where the experiment was conducted. Arguments are rec-
orded with the help of a video software. However, only the resulting soundtrack is used in the experiment, 
i.e. only the voice recording is available and no visual images. Recordings that do not meet the ideals of a 
Stress participant cannot be re-recorded. Participants of Control also have a five-minute time slot to con-
sider what makes a convincing argumentation for analytical thinking. As payoff is performance-dependent
in both groups, all participants of the experiment have an incentive to concern themselves with the task
during the preparation time.
Each participant of Control then evaluates each of the five two-minute recordings on a scale from 0 to 
100% (“The person convincingly explained that they possess analytical thinking skills.”). To rule out order 
effects, each member of Control receives the recordings in a different sequence. While performance is not 
evaluated in the original TSST, we measure performance to control for potential influences on post-task 
behavior.
In contrast to the original TSST that pays a flat fee to each participant, we incentivize the task based on 
the results of the performance analysis. Earnings vary for participants of Stress with the median rating 
given by the members of Control, i.e. the higher the median rating, the higher the payoff. Earnings for 
participants of Control vary with the absolute distance between the individual assessment of a Stress mem-
ber and the median rating |   | of that member. The smaller the distance, the higher the payoff. As every 
Control member assesses five different recordings, the sum of five individual payoffs amounts to a Control
member’s total earnings. In both groups, total earnings range from €1.00 to €10.00 (see Tables 1 and 2).
TABLE 1 EARNINGS – STRESS 
	
x	
 10% < x	
 20% < x	
 30% < x 	
 40% < x	

€1.00 €2.00 €3.00 €4.00 €5.00
50% < x	
 60% < x	
 70% < x	
 80% < x	
 90% < x		

€6.00 €7.00 €8.00 €9.00 €10.00
TABLE 2: EARNINGS PER EVALUATION – CONTROL
|xi-xi| >
22.5%- points
20%-points <|xi-xi| 
22.5%-points
17.5%-points <|xi-xi| 
20%-points
15%-points <|xi-xi| 
17.5%-points
12.5%-points <|xi-xi| 
15%-points
7€0.20 €0.40 €0.60 €0.80 €1.00
10%-points <|xi-xi| 
12.5%-points
7.5%-points <|xi-xi| 
10%-points
5%-points <|xi-xi| 
7.5%-points
2.5%-points <|xi-xi|

-points
0%-|xi-xi| 
2.5%-points
€1.20 €1.40 €1.60 €1.80 €2.00
The original TSST further contains a second task—serially and correctly subtracting a two-digit number 
from a four-digit number for about 80 seconds. This task adds another element of uncontrollability as par-
ticipants are called to calculate in front of the committee in a random order. However, we do not to employ
this task for several reasons: Our student sample stems from a university that largely offers technical or 
economics-based subjects. Chances were therefore high that the participants may experience this task as 
pleasant or familiar. Furthermore, the calculation task induces yet another element of socio-evaluative threat 
and therefore requires the presence of the expert panel or confederates who correct a subject if a calculation 
is incorrect. Note that von Dawans et al. (2012) describe a variation of the TSST, in which participants first 
complete the public-speaking task and then provide their answers for different choice tasks. Afterwards, 
the subjects complete the mental-arithmetic task and give answers to another set of tasks. The corresponding 
cortisol response shows that the public-speaking task alone induces a significant increase in cortisol by 
about 100 percent on average, while the arithmetic task only contributes to a very small additional increase 
in cortisol.
Apart from inducing acute socio-evaluative stress, participants of Stress might experience that their role 
in the stress task comes with less power. As the type of stress requires that another party might judge the 
performance of the treatment group negatively, this lack of power cannot be avoided. When considering 
situations of socio-evaluative threat at the workplace, such as subjective performance evaluations done by 
managers, co-workers, or customers, the power difference also becomes apparent. In the same vein, our 
unstressed control group might experience higher power because their evaluations are payoff-relevant for 
the stressed treatment group. Hence, socio-evaluative stress and power differentials come hand-in-hand and 
we will therefore not be able to disentangle reactions to acute stress from reactions to power. 
The literature suggests that power increases confidence and reassures of currently accessible thoughts.
Côté et al. 2011 and DeCelles et al. 2012 show that increases in power result in more antisocial (prosocial) 
behavior if moral identity is weak (strong). The relationship between power and stress was studied by Sher-
man et al. (2012). The authors show that the more powerful a leadership position, the lower the levels of
the stress hormone cortisol and the lower reports of anxiety. A concept related to power is social status, i.e. 
increased social rank or wealth (e.g. Piff et al. 2012, Trautmann 2013). The literature on the interplay of 
social status on prosocial and antisocial behavior shows that the underlying pattern is complex. Piff et al. 
(2012) provide evidence that higher social status is related to increases in cheating. However, Trautmann
8et al. (2013) show that low social status individuals agree more that lying in one’s own interest can be 
justified and that lying is not significantly correlated with financial wealth, income, or being a supervisor
(i.e. high social status). Further evidence shows that individuals with high social status are more trusting 
when interacting with a stranger (Korndörfler et al. 2015) and more willing to give to low-income partici-
pants (Smeets et al. 2015). While social status is related to power, we do not expect social status to drive 
our results, as our participants come from a student sample who participate in economic experiments as 
part of their net income. Furthermore, earnings possibilities are equal between our treatment and control 
group.
While it may generally be difficult to disentangle the effects of power and acute socio-evaluative stress 
on behavior, our experimental setup reflects real life situations in which one party has to perform a task that 
is evaluated by another party. Just like in reality, where performance usually determines payoffs, payoffs 
in our task are also performance-based. Additionally, our experimental setup comes with the advantage that 
we can control whether performance under acute socio-evaluative stress influences behavior following the 
stressor.
3.2 Experimental Procedures
Note that the aim of this first study is to provide evidence that our stress task succeeds in increasing stress 
levels in the participants of Stress compared to those of Control. To study lying behavior (see chapter 4), 
we use a different sample of participants who had no previous experience with our stress task. The data 
presented in this chapter stems from 26 healthy male6 subjects aged between 19 and 33 years (mean age of 
25.43). Half of the subjects were members of the treatment group, the other half formed the control group.
The experiment took place between 3 and 5 p.m. to control for diurnal variations of cortisol (Pruessner et 
al. 1997). This is important because cortisol levels are highest after awakening and decrease over the course 
of the day (Kirschbaum and Hellhammer 1989), i.e. the results from experiments scheduled at different 
times of the day may lead to similar effects in behavior, whereas the cortisol reactivity shows a different 
pattern. Participants were recruited using hroot (Bock et al. 2014). To avoid the environment of the labor-
atory stressing participants, only subjects with previous experience in economic lab experiments were in-
vited to take part in the experiment. Before the start of the stress experiment, all participants gave their 
written consent for the collection and analysis of five saliva samples and the use of the resulting data in this 
study. Exclusion criteria for the experiment were previous participation in a stress-related experiment, stud-
ying psychology, intake of medication known to influence cortisol levels or cortisol responses, smoking 
6 Kajantie and Phillips (2006), Kirschbaum et al. (1995), and Kirschbaum et al. (1999) and show that cortisol responses are gender-specific.
9more than five cigarettes per day, and reported mental disorder as indicated by the Brief Symptom Inven-
tory-18 (BSI-18, Derogatis 2000). Four of the original 30 participants did not meet these criteria.
After arriving to the lab, participants were informed that the experiment required the collection of five
saliva samples per participant. It was pointed out that only cortisol and no other biomarker would be ex-
tracted from the samples. The samples were evaluated by Dresden LabService. There are no known risks 
involved in providing a saliva sample, which is acquired with the help of a Salivette7 and requires chewing 
on a cotton swab. The participants were further assured that their data would be stored in a pseudonymized 
form such that their participation in the study can never be revealed. 
FIGURE 1 STUDY DESIGN INCLUDING AVERAGE DURATION. S = SALIVA SAMPLE, VAS = VISUAL ANALOGUE SCALE.
The experiment was computer-based. Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) was used to program the experimental 
software. The explanation of the data processing, sample collection and evaluation marked the starting point 
of the experiment and lasted for about 16 minutes (see Figure 1, see Appendix A for the instructions to the 
stress task). The participants were told that they would receive two additional rounds of instructions during 
the course of the experiment, and that the following part of the experiment includes the first saliva sample 
followed by self-reports with the help of several questionnaires. Participants then took a seat at their visually 
isolated computer workstations and gave their first saliva sample. The seats were assigned by lot. Note that 
the experiment did not proceed unless all questions were answered individually at the participant’s work-
station. A battery of nine visual analogue scales (VAS, see Appendix B) were collected after each saliva 
sample. These self-reports were assessed on a scale from 0-100% and included, for instance, anxiety and 
stress. Participants received a show-up fee of €5.00.
Providing the first saliva sample and answering the VAS and questionnaires took about 12 minutes on 
average. The questions included sociodemographic data, drug and alcohol intake. Furthermore, data was
collected on short versions of the BIG5 inventory (Rammstedt and John 2007) and the BSI-18 (Spitzer et 
7 Salivette® Cortisol by Sarstedt is a small plastic cartridge containing a cotton swab and is designed for cortisol determination from saliva.
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al. 2011). Participants gave the second saliva sample after providing their answers, about 28 minutes after 
arriving to the laboratory. Subsequently, the participants gathered in one room and the second set of in-
structions was read aloud to them. Participants were not allowed to talk to each other and non-verbal cues 
were difficult to exchange between treatment groups due to the set-up of the lab and the fact that participants 
of Stress stayed seated at their visually isolated workstations. In the instructions, the participants received 
information on whether they are part of the treatment or the control group. The group assignment depended 
on the location of the workstation. Note that all participants received the identical set of instructions irre-
spective of their role in the experiment. The experiment did not continue until all of the participants’ ques-
tions were answered at the individual workstations (around 42 minutes into the experiment). 
While members of Control evaluated the argumentations, Stress members rested for 10-15 minutes (on 
average 14 minutes) to allow salivary cortisol to accumulate. During the resting period, participants sat at
their workstations. The use of the computers was not allowed during this time.
After the evaluation (Control) and the resting period (Stress), participants gave the fourth saliva sample
at around 69 minutes into the experiment. Afterwards, the participants gathered again and the last set of
instructions was read aloud to them. It announced another 10-minute rest for both types of participants.
After this resting period, the participants gave the fifth saliva sample and answered the VAS one last time.
Participants received another €5.00 for this part of the experiment. The accumulated earnings were paid out 
in cash at the end of the experiment. Participants were informed about their earnings from the stress task 
after the end of the last resting period, i.e. at the end of the entire experiment. Average Stress earnings 
(including the show-up fee) amounted to €16.33 (SD = 1.989), average Control earnings were €15.96 (SD 
= 1.869). A U-Test indicates no statistically significant earnings differences between the two groups.
3.3 Cortisol Response
Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) provide evidence that the peak cortisol response occurs 21–40 min after 
the onset of an acute psychological stressor. In our setup, the participants received the instructions for the 
stress task about 39 minutes prior to the collection of the fourth saliva sample. The recording-task started
about 20 minutes prior to the collection of the fourth sample. Figure 2 indicates the development of salivary 
cortisol (in nanomols per liter). The gray bar indicates the stress task. Salivette refers to the saliva samples.
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FIGURE 2 MEAN SALIVARY CORTISOL LEVELS AND CORRESPONDING SEM OVER THE COURSE OF THE EXPERIMENT.
U-Tests indicate that there are no statistically significant differences in cortisol levels for the first, second,
and third sample across participants of the control and stress condition.8 Further U-Tests show that differ-
ences between the treatment and control group are significant for samples four and five. Using a two-way 
analysis of variance9 with repeated measures, we evaluate the cortisol levels measured in samples three to 
five across the two treatments. Greenhouse-Geisser corrections are applied. The analysis shows that the 
stress treatment induced a significant increase in cortisol levels, while cortisol levels in the control treatment 
followed the natural circadian rhythm and decreased over time. The main effect of time is highly significant 
(F(1.332, 31.97) = 0.007), the treatment effect is marginally significant (F(1, 24) = 0.065), and the interac-
tion of time and treatment is again significant (F(1.332, 31.97) = 0.016).
The successful triggering of a cortisol response following the stress task is further supported by a random 
effects regression, which additionally allows us to control for further variables (see Table 3). The regression 
explains cortisol in nmol per liter measured through the five saliva samples. Standard errors are robust and 
clustered at the participant level. In Model I, the treatment dummy Stress is not significant. This is not 
surprising, as all five saliva samples are included in the analysis, while only two of the samples are taken 
after the stress task. We further find that cortisol increases significantly from round 1 to round 2—on aver-
age by 1.959 nmol/l. This effect is not picked up if cortisol levels between rounds 1 and 2 are compared 
with the help of a U-Test. The effect is also smaller than the threshold of 2.5 nmol/l (Miller et al. 2013),
commonly used to identify a stress reaction. Comparing round 1 and 3 cortisol levels, we do not spot a 
significant difference. Starting with sample 3, we observe that cortisol begins to decrease. This effect re-
flects the diurnal rhythm of cortisol in humans. The treatment-time-interaction (Stress x Cortisol Measure)
proves to be insignificant for the first three saliva samples. Recall that the actual speaking-task is performed 
after the third saliva sample is taken. Therefore, the significant treatment-time-interactions for rounds 4 and 
8 Participants were not aware of the stress task before giving the first two saliva samples. The third sample was provided shortly after the instructions 
of the stress task were explained.
9 We use log(cortisol) as the independent variable in the analysis.
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5 indicate that our stress intervention was successful in significantly increasing cortisol levels compared to 
the pre-stress sample 1. This result is in line with the meta-analytic evidence on tasks with elements of 
socio-evaluative threat and uncontrollability provided by Dickerson and Kemeny (2004). The authors show 
that for this type of task, cortisol responses are elevated up to 60 minutes after stressor termination.
In Model II, we additionally test the influence of age and performance10 on the cortisol reaction. Note 
that performance can only interact with the cortisol response after the third sample is collected, i.e. after the 
speaking task. Therefore, the model includes sample 4 and 5 data only. We find that our stress intervention 
has a positive and highly significant influence on cortisol. Cortisol falls significantly from sample 4 to 
sample 5 (Cortisol Measure 5). As cortisol levels naturally fall during the afternoon, this result is not sur-
prising. Comparing the data from sample 4 and 5 in the stressed group (Stress x Cortisol Measure Stress 5),
we find a significant decrease in the level of cortisol. This is also intuitive, as the stress task is performed 
before sample 4 is collected and the collection of sample 5 is preceded by a stress-free resting period such
that the cortisol level has time to decrease. We do not find significant age effects. This is in line with the 
findings of Kudielka et al. (2004a) who show that socio-evaluative threat results in a significant stress 
reaction that is independent of the age group. Additionally, we find that performance does not have a sig-
nificant effect on the cortisol reaction in general. However, there appear to be treatment differences for 
performance. The interaction effect of performance and stress indicates that the better a stressed treatment 
group member performs in the task, the smaller this person’s cortisol reaction. Nevertheless, the cortisol 
reaction remains significantly higher for the treatment group than for the control group, even for the highest 
levels of performance (Wald test, p < 0.001).
10 For a member of Stress, performance is the median assessment (between 0 and 100 points). For a member of Control, performance depends on 
the absolute difference between the individual assessment of a Stress member and the respective player’s median assessment. We sum up the 
differences for each of the five evaluations so that performance in Control also varies between 0 and 100 points. Average performance for partici-
pants of Stress was 60.769 points and for Control 58.462 points (SEM Stress = 5.036, SEM Control = 5.170). This difference is not statistically 
significant (U-Test: p = 0.850).
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TABLE 3: CORTISOL RESPONSE
Cortisol nmol/l Model I Model II: Cortisol measure 	 4
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err.
P > |z| Coef. Robust 
Std. Err.
P > |z|
Stress -1.6957 2.2029 0.441 27.0997 10.7233 0.011
Cortisol Measure
2 1.9592 0.8154 0.016
3 -0.1738 1.3672 0.899
4 -1.8107 1.8569 0.329
5 -4.2462 1.9291 0.028 -2.4354 0.5744 0.000
Stress x Cortisol Measure
Stress 2 1.1684 1.2868 0.364
Stress 3 3.5508 2.5009 0.156
Stress 4 14.4192 5.7619 0.012
Stress 5 6.9977 2.7315 0.010 -7.4215 4.1115 0.071
Age 0.1321 0.2179 0.544 0.5082 0.5126 0.321
Performance 0.0797 0.0834 0.339
Stress x Performance -0.2491 0.1314 0.058
Constant 6.3396 5.7164 0.267 -10.0941 17.8100 0.571
RANDOM EFFECTS REGRESSIONS. STANDARD ERRORS ARE CORRECTED FOR CLUSTERING AT THE PARTICIPANT LEVEL. MODEL I: N = 130, R-SQ OVERALL 
= 0.186, WALD 
 = 97.61, P < 0.001.; MODEL II: N = 52, R-SQ OVERALL = 0.270, WALD 
 = 26.94, P < 0.001.
4. The propensity to lie and to trust under acute stress
4.1 Experimental Design
To study lying behavior, we use the lying task introduced by Gneezy et al. (2013, see Appendix A for 
instructions). The participants are divided into two groups of six11—first and second movers. In our setup, 
the groups are assigned randomly and group assignment is independent of the role in the stress task. Our 
participants were explicitly made aware of this matching protocol. The lying game is played for 18 rounds. 
During each round, a first mover is randomly and anonymously matched with a second mover, i.e. while 
each participant knows that he/she interacts repeatedly with the players of the other group, none of the 
players can build a reputation or identify himself/herself to his/her matching partner. In the same vein, a 
player never knows whether the current partner belonged to the control or treatment group of the previous 
stress task. Therefore, behavior cannot be influenced by changes in beliefs about the partner’s reaction to 
stress.
Each pair of players is randomly assigned a number between 1 and 6 (the die roll d). Each number is 
similarly likely and each pair receives a different number. The first mover sends a message m concerning 
the die roll to the second mover. This message can be truthful or it can contain a lie. The first mover has an 
11 Depending on the show-up rate of our participants, we added two Control members to our stress task, leading to five observations for Stress and 
seven observations for Control per session. We also adjusted the lying task so that it could be played with 10 instead of 12 players, if necessary.
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incentive to report higher numbers, as his/her payoff increases with the message sent. A first mover’s payoff 
in points is: 
first mover = 10 + 2  .
The second mover has to decide whether to follow the message sent by the first mover. If a second mover
follows a correct message, his/her payoff is 10 points. If the second mover follows an incorrect message, 
i.e. a lie, his/her payoff is 0 points. If the second mover decides not to follow, his/her payoff is 3 points.
The second mover’s payoff is given as: 
second mover = 10 if the second mover follows and m=d 0 if the second mover follows and 3 if the second mover does not follow    
Irrespective of the die roll, a first mover concerned with individual payoff maximization will always 
report m = 6. However, if lying is morally costly or if the first mover cares about the second mover’s payoff, 
the first mover’s decision will not only depend on self-interested payoff maximization but also on the harm 
that a lie can cause to the second mover.
We use the strategy method, i.e. we have information on the first mover’s lying behavior, not only for 
the die roll, but also for all potential die rolls from 1 to 6. We also have information on the second mover’s
decision to follow a message for all potential messages 1 to 6. At the end of a round, both types of players 
receive a payoff table indicating the executed decision including the die roll, the first and the second 
mover’s decision regarding the die roll, as well as first and the second mover’s payoff, and a decision and 
payoff history.
As a first mover’s decision to lie may depend on his/her belief whether the second mover will follow the 
message, we additionally ask the first movers to indicate beliefs about the second mover’s decision to follow
for every potential message m. We incentivize this part of the task by awarding an additional 50 points to 
those first movers who correctly predict second mover behavior in more than 2/3 of the cases.
We report the results from 146 participants (13 sessions) who performed the stress task described in 
chapter 3 without providing cortisol samples. None of the subjects participated in the experiment reported 
in chapter 3. Instead of the final 10-minute resting period, the participants played the lying game, which 
took on average 15 minutes to complete plus 10 minutes to explain the instructions.12 Dickerson and Ke-
meny (2004) show that for our type of stress task, cortisol responses are elevated up to 60 minutes after 
stressor termination. Nevertheless, the timing of the decision-making tasks usually differs between studies, 
e.g. in von Dawans et al. (2012) participants provide their answers shortly (about 5 minutes) after their 
exposure to the stressor. These timing-issues make inter-study comparisons difficult, as the timing can 
influence the decision-making (Pabst et al. 2013). Therefore, one might argue that our results do not arise 
12 We refrained from providing the instructions for the lying game at the very beginning of the entire experiment to rule out that participants design 
lying strategies while they are still unstressed.
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during an acutely stressful event (additionally characterized by an increased heart rate, for instance) but 
during recovery from acute socio-evaluative stress.
Both types of players in the lying game received the identical set of instructions and gathered in the same 
room for instructions, i.e. the matchings protocol, the payoff functions and the opportunity to lie were com-
mon knowledge for all players in the game. The instructions were read out to all of the participants. Partic-
ipants were not allowed to talk to each other and non-verbal cues were difficult to exchange due to the set-
up of the lab and the fact that participants of Stress stayed seated at their visually isolated workstations. The 
lying game started after all participants’ questions were answered at the individual workstations. Questions 
were answered according to a standard protocol that allowed only explanations of the game but no sugges-
tions on behavior. In total, we provide data from 45 observations for first movers and 40 observations for 
second movers in Control, as well as 30 first movers and 31 second movers13 in Stress. The participants 
were recruited using hroot (Bock et al. 2014). Members of the recruitment pool who studied psychology or 
a related field and could potentially be aware of the broad literature on stress research were excluded from 
recruitment. Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 37. The sessions were conducted during different times of 
the day as Kudielka et al. (2004b) have shown that responses to socio-evaluative stress measured in the 
morning and afternoon are comparable.
Note that the aim of this study is not to link cortisol levels to behavioral change. Instead, we are interested 
in behavioral differences induced by acute socio-evaluative stress. Therefore, we refrain from taking saliva 
samples from the participants of the lying task. Additionally, we also allow both male and female subjects
to participate in the study. Even though we did not access cortisol levels for female participants, other 
studies have shown socio-evaluative stress to arise in females as well (e.g. Kirschbaum et al. 1995). We 
therefore expect our stress task to induce acute socio-evaluative stress also in our female participants. The 
evaluation of the self-reported emotional states support this. We find a similar pattern of emotional change 
between VAS II and VAS III for male and female participants, i.e. before the participants in our stress task 
know that they have to provide an argument and after this information is available to them (directly before 
they record the argument). Mean values and corresponding test results for VAS II and III according to 
treatment and gender can be found in Appendix B.
The experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Participants received their earnings 
from the stress task and the lying game at the end of the entire experiment. Each point earned in the lying 
game was worth €0.04. Note that the participants received feedback on their performance in the stress task
after they made all of their decisions in the lying task. Each session (stress task plus lying game) lasted 
about 82 minutes with average total earnings of €26.41 for first movers and €15.73 for second movers of 
the lying game (including a 5€ show up payment and the earnings from the stress task). Control group 
13 A technical difficulty lead to the loss of performance data for four participants who were therefore excluded from the analysis.
16
performance in the stress task was 61.835 points (SEM = 2.366) and average Stress performance was 63.442 
points (SEM = 2.586). This difference is not statistically significant.
In Appendix C, we provide a robustness check for our results concerning the decision to lie. As the 
participants of Stress might include information in their recordings that may influence behavior and beliefs 
of the control group, we design a variant of the stress task in which no such information can be unilaterally 
exchanged. In the experiment reported in the Appendix, members of Control evaluate recordings of another 
session’s stressed treatment group. The results support our findings concerning the willingness to tell a
selfish black lie, which we report in the next chapter.
4.2 Results
Decision to tell a selfish black lie—Extensive margin
The design of the lying game allows us to study selfish black lies (increasing own payoff and reducing
other’s payoff) and spiteful black lies (reducing own and other’s payoff). With the help of the strategy 
method, we observe 5,316 truthful messages, 2,416 selfish black lies, and 368 spiteful black lies. Our anal-
ysis does not reveal a significant influence of socio-evaluative threat on the propensity of telling a spiteful
black lie. We therefore focus on analyzing the propensity of telling a selfish black lie in all of the following 
analyses and do not include the observations for the spiteful black lies. Including both types of lies into our 
analyses does not change our findings (see Appendix C for corresponding results).
Figure 3 reports the average probability to send a selfish black lie for first movers over the course of the 
game and for the die rolls 1-5 (die roll 6 is not depicted, as it is not possible to send a selfish black lie for 
that number). We observe that 56 percent of the messages sent in Control and 74 percent of the messages 
sent in Stress contain the truth. Thus, we find quite a large aversion to lying at the extensive margin in both 
treatments but also signs for treatment differences in the willingness to report a selfish black lie. Figure 3 
provides further support for stress-related differences concerning the decision to send a selfish black lie.
Chi-squared tests confirm this result for the overall data set and for each possible die roll (for all tests: p < 
0.001). Even though the treatment difference does not seem as pronounced during the first round of the 
game, we observe a lower probability of telling a selfish black lie in our stressed treatment group already 
during round 1 of the game (chi-squared test, p = 0.051).
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FIGURE 3 TOP: AVERAGE PROBABILITY OF A SELFISH BLACK LIE OVER THE COURSE OF THE GAME INCLUDING 95% CONFIDENCE BANDS, BOTTOM: AVER-
AGE PROBABILITY OF A SELFISH BLACK LIE INCLUDING 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS—OVERALL AND FOR EACH DIE ROLL.
Table 4 displays the results of three panel probit regressions explaining the binary lying decision of first 
movers. Model I provides results without variables that are potentially endogenous. It shows that the will-
ingness to report a selfish black lie increases significantly with the round. We find that the lying probability 
is significantly reduced by about 16 percentage points for subjects in treatment Stress. Furthermore, lying 
decreases significantly the higher the die roll and the older the subject. Both of these effects are also de-
scribed by Gneezy et al. (2013). Furthermore, the data shows that the probability of sending a selfish black 
lie does not differ significantly between our male and female participants.
Model II additionally includes the performance in the stress task, the first mover beliefs about second 
mover behavior and the previous round’s lying decision. The results of Model II indicate that the decision 
to lie does not vary significantly with the round number. Again, the die roll d has a significantly negative 
effect on the decision to lie, i.e. the higher the die roll, the lower the probability of sending a message that 
does not correspond to the die roll. We further find a significant effect of our stress intervention on the 
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decision to lie: Participants who experienced acute socio-evaluative stress are significantly less likely to 
send a selfish black lie than the participants in Control. The effect size is about 10 percentage points. The 
results further show that the lying propensity significantly decreases with age. Model II additionally indi-
cates that male and female participants14 do not differ significantly in their lying probability. We further 
control for performance in the stress task, as, for instance, participants may be tempted to lie if they per-
formed poorly in the stress task in order to compensate a low payoff from the stress task. We find that the 
performance effect is close to zero percentage points and insignificant.15
Model II further indicates that participants who believe that the second mover will follow the message
are significantly less likely to lie (Avg. belief SecMo follows  [0,1]). To control for this effect, we use the 
average belief calculated for rounds 1-18 to avoid endogeneity problems in the regressions that may arise 
because the decision on the message may depend on the belief during each round. Additionally, we find 
that a first mover who indicated a message that did not correspond to the die roll during the previous round,
is significantly more likely to lie during the current round (First mover reported  t-1, 1 = lie in t-1, 0 = 
no lie in t-1).
While the use of the strategy method allows us to study the lying behavior for all possible die rolls, the 
lying propensity may further be influenced by the decision that was executed during the previous round of 
the game. Since both types of players in the lying game are informed about the actual die roll, the message 
sent, the second mover’s decision to follow, and the first and second mover’s payoffs, we introduce Model 
III. In this model, we control whether the second mover received a lie during the previous round and whether 
the second mover followed the message during the previous round. Note that all the effects reported in 
Model II also prevail in Model III. Again, being a participant of the stressed treatment group significantly
decreases the probability of reporting a selfish black lie, by about 10 percentage points. The decision of the 
second mover to follow the message during the previous round does not affect a first mover’s current round 
lying decision (SecMo followed t-1, 1 = corresponding second mover followed the message in t-1, 0 = 
corresponding second mover did not follow the message in t-1). However, if the decision executed during 
the previous round comprised a message that did not correspond to the die roll, a first mover is significantly 
less likely to send a selfish black lie during the current round (SecMo received lie t-1, 1 = second mover 
received a lie in t-1, 0 = second mover did not receive a lie in t-1).
Result I: At the extensive margin, participants under socio-evaluative stress are significantly less 
likely to report a selfish black lie.
14 We do not find a significant gender-stress-interaction in our models.
15 We use the payoff-relevant performance data to control for this effect. This data is available to the participants at the very end of the experiment. 
To check the robustness of this result, we also run a model including each participant’s non-incentivized self-evaluation after the stress task. The 
effect of this measure on the lying propensity also shows to be insignificant. Note that we also do not find a significant stress-performance-interac-
tion.
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TABLE 4: FIRST MOVER’S DECISION TO LIE: EXTENSIVE MARGIN
Lying: First mover reports 
m >  d Model I Model II Model IIICoef. (Mar-
ginal Proba-
bilities)
Robust 
Std. Err.
P > |z|
Coef. (Mar-
ginal Prob-
abilities)
Robust 
Std. Err.
P > |z|
Coef. (Mar-
ginal Prob-
abilities)
Robust 
Std. Err.
P > |z|
Round 0.0043 0.0018 0.016 0.0018 0.0014 0.183 0.0020 0.0015 0.182
Die roll (d) -0.0652 0.0101 0.000 -0.0570 0.0053 0.000 -0.0544 0.0052 0.000
Stress -0.1629 0.0700 0.020 -0.0989 0.0462 0.032 -0.1033 0.0485 0.033
Age -0.0152 0.0086 0.078 -0.0105 0.0050 0.037 -0.0113 0.0053 0.033
Female 0.0516 0.0723 0.475 0.0239 0.0461 0.605 0.0285 0.0490 0.561
Performance 0.0003 0.0010 0.773 0.0003 0.0011 0.762
Avg. belief SecMo follows -0.2112 0.0488 0.000 -0.2109 0.0509 0.000
FirstMo reported  t-1 0.3159 0.0494 0.000 0.3522 0.0487 0.000
SecMo followed t-1 -0.0177 0.0174 0.305
SecMo received lie t-1 -0.0690 0.0182 0.000
RANDOM EFFECTS PANEL PROBIT REGRESSIONS. STANDARD ERRORS ARE CORRECTED FOR CLUSTERING AT THE SUBJECT LEVEL. MODEL I: N = 7,732,
PSEUDO R2 = 0.229, LOG PSEUDOLIKELIHOOD = -2307.9216, WALD 
 = 146.83, P < 0.001. MODEL II: N = 7,303, PSEUDO R2 = 0.407, LOG PSEUDOLIKE-
LIHOOD = -1655.9238, WALD 
 = 303.94, P < 0.001. MODEL III: N = 7,303, PSEUDO R2 = 0.416, LOG PSEUDOLIKELIHOOD = -1630.4813, WALD 
 =
393.55, P < 0.001.
First mover beliefs
Different reasons come to mind that may explain the change in the willingness to send a selfish black lie 
after acute socio-evaluative stress. The change in behavior could result from reduced strategic reasoning
(Leder et al. 2013), i.e. stressed participants are not aware of the opportunity to lie. Furthermore, their 
beliefs concerning second mover behavior could differ from those of Control. Another explanation con-
cerns changes in distributional preferences, as acute socio-evaluative stress may influence moral decision-
making (Youssef et al. 2012). Note that our instructions were quite clear concerning the lying opportunity. 
We also answered all questions concerning the game before it started. We therefore neither believe that 
socio-evaluative stress limited our participants’ cognitive resources so that they were not aware of the lying 
opportunity, nor do we believe that lack of awareness of the opportunity to lie caused behavioral changes.
If acute socio-evaluative stress leads the first mover to believe that the second mover will follow the 
message sent, first movers could refrain from sending selfish black lies in order to avoid harming the second 
mover. Thus, a change in beliefs regarding the second mover behavior could explain the effect that we 
observe. Figure 4 gives a visual representation of the indicated beliefs that the second mover follows a 
message. In Table 5, we report the corresponding results of three random effects panel probit regressions,
with which we explain the dummy variable Belief SecMo follows (1 = first movers expects the second 
mover to follow a message, 0 = first movers does not expect the second mover to follow a message). Model 
I indicates that these beliefs do not change significantly after our stress intervention. In fact, the only sig-
nificant effect we observe is the message sent, i.e. a first mover is less likely to believe that the second 
mover will follow a message, the higher the message sent. 
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Model II of table 5 reports the results of a random effects panel regression. The change in model is 
necessary due to the inclusion of the Stress-round interaction term (Ai and Norton 2003). The model addi-
tionally considers previous round behavior. Model II indicates that the best predictor for a first mover belief 
is the first mover’s previous round belief (dummy variable Belief SecMo follows t-1). Furthermore, we see 
that if a first mover observes that the second mover followed the previous round’s message, he or she is 
more likely to believe that the second mover will follow the same message during the current round (dummy 
variable SecMo followed t-1). We do not find a significant effect of Stress on the first mover belief and we 
also do not find a significant interaction of Stress and the round number (Stress x Round).
Recall that the information whether the second mover followed the message is only provided to the first 
movers for the decision that was executed by the computer. First movers who report the truth are able to 
observe second mover following behavior for a wider range of messages than first movers who prefer over-
reporting the die roll. Since we observe stress-related treatment differences with respect to honesty, partic-
ipants of Control and Stress might have different information concerning the second mover behavior. 
Therefore, Model III reports regression results only for the first round of the lying game when informational 
differences cannot influence decision-making. Again, we find that first mover beliefs regarding second 
mover behavior in Stress do not differ significantly from those in Control. Hence, our analyses indicate that 
socio-evaluative stress does not alter our first movers’ beliefs concerning the second movers’ following 
behavior.
FIGURE 4: FIRST MOVER AVERAGE BELIEF THAT SECOND MOVER FOLLOWS INCLUDING 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS.
Although we cannot directly test for this, it appears that socio-evaluative stress alters distributional pref-
erences among our first movers in the lying game. Such changes in distributional preferences could result 
because participants actively prefer honest responses to dishonest ones. Alternatively, the apparent change 
in distributional preferences could be due to a reduction in strategic reasoning caused by acute socio-eval-
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uative stress, i.e. participants resort to behavioral heuristics, which results in a less skewed earnings distri-
bution across players. As previous research on non-incentivized decisions in moral dilemma situations has
shown (e.g. Singer et al. 2017, Youssef et al. 2012), stressed participants make fewer choices that involve 
harming other participants. As argued in the literature, this change in behavior can arise because the stress 
response activates brain regions involved in emotional processing (Arnsten 2009, Ramos and Arnsten
2007), indicating that stressed individuals seem to prefer the intuitive, honest response to the dishonest, 
individually payoff-maximizing response. In our study, the honest response can reflect other-regarding 
concerns like inequity aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Fehr and Schmidt 1999) or preferences aimed 
at increasing the payoffs of those worse off in the game (Charness and Rabin 2002, Engelmann and Strobel 
2004).
TABLE 5: FIRST MOVER’S BELIEFS CONCERNING SECOND MOVERS’ WILLINGNESS TO FOLLOW A MESSAGE
Belief SecMo Follows Model I Model II Model III: Round 1 only
Coef. (Mar-
ginal Proba-
bilities)
Robust 
Std. Err.
P > |z| Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err.
P > |z|
Coef. (Mar-
ginal Proba-
bilities)
Robust 
Std. Err.
P > |z|
Round -0.0005 0.0017 0.789 -0.0018 0.0016 0.274
Message sent -0.0185 0.0074 0.012 -0.0044 0.0029 0.126 -0.0333 0.0129 0.010
Stress 0.0741 0.0617 0.230 0.0129 0.0294 0.660 -0.0284 0.0661 0.668
Age -0.0018 0.0076 0.815 -0.0021 0.0028 0.459 0.0020 0.0084 0.813
Female -0.0736 0.0622 0.236 -0.0168 0.0216 0.437 -0.1126 0.0636 0.077
Performance -0.0003 0.0004 0.457
Belief SecMo follows t-1 0.6928 0.0384 0.000
SecMo followed t-1 0.1067 0.0182 0.000
Stress x round 0.0007 0.0020 0.740
Constant 0.2610 0.0917 0.004
STANDARD ERRORS ARE CORRECTED FOR CLUSTERING AT THE SUBJECT LEVEL. MODEL I & III: RANDOM EFFECTS PANEL PROBIT REGRESSIONS. MODEL I:
N = 7,732, PSEUDO R2 = 0.017, LOG PSEUDOLIKELIHOOD = -2745.0037, WALD 
 = 9.37, P = 0.0952. MODEL II: RANDOM EFFECTS REGRESSION, N = 7,303,
R2 OVERALL = 0.521, WALD 
 = 790.93, P < 0.001. MODEL III: N = 429, PSEUDO R2 = 0.043, LOG PSEUDOLIKELIHOOD = -188.2840, WALD 
 = 9.26, P
= 0.055.
Decision to send a selfish black lie—Lying cost
Note that a first mover concerned with efficiency should refrain from lying if the second mover follows, 
to maximize joint payoffs.16 If the first mover is solely concerned with his or her own payoff, the first mover
should lie to the fullest extent, i.e. always report a 6 irrespective of the payoff consequences for the second 
mover. Reporting a lie smaller than 6 reflects that lying is morally costly to the first mover. The structure 
of the data allows us to test whether acute socio-evaluative stress influences this lying cost. We report the 
16 A truthfully reported die roll of 1 with the second mover following leads to a total payoff of 22, which equals the payoff from incorrectly 
reporting a 6 and the second mover following the lie. Thus, a first mover with concerns for efficiency is just indifferent between being truthful and 
incorrectly reporting a 6 when d = 1.
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corresponding regression results in Table 6. The dependent variable is the probability of sending the incor-
rect message of 6 (1 = first movers sends the incorrect message 6, 0 = first movers sends an incorrect 
message smaller than 6), i.e. we only report data from lies that contain messages higher than the die roll.
Model I results in an insignificant treatment effect of Stress. Only the round number and the die roll are 
positively and significantly related to the probability that the first mover incorrectly reports a message of 
6. The results of Model II indicate a significantly positive effect of the die roll, i.e. the higher the number 
assigned, the higher the probability of incorrectly reporting a 6. Apparently, we observe that the aversion 
to lie increases with the size of the lie (see also Lundquist et al. 2009). We also see that participants are less 
likely to send the message 6 if they are under acute socio-evaluative stress. This effect is, however, not 
statistically significant. We also do not find any significant gender or age related influences. Concerning 
the performance from the stress task, we find that the higher the performance, the higher the probability of 
incorrectly reporting a message of 6. Additionally, we find that a first mover who anticipates that the second 
mover follows the message is significantly less likely to incorrectly report the number 6 (Avg. belief SecMo 
follows), i.e. tends to report smaller lies. We also find a reluctance to report the largest possible lie in 
participants who sent an incorrect message during the previous round. Both of these effects can be inter-
preted as additional evidence for an aversion to lying at the intensive margin.
While evidence for an aversion to lying is abundant in our data set, we also see that it significantly de-
creases over the course of the game. We further find that participants who reported a 6 during the last round 
are significantly more likely to also report a 6 during the current round (m = 6 t-1), i.e. their moral cost of 
acting anti-socially is reduced. In Model III of Table 6, we additionally report the second mover’s reaction 
to the first mover choice from the previous round. Note that the effects that we report in Model II remain 
unchanged. In fact, the second mover’s reaction to the first mover’s choice of the previous round does not
significantly influence the intensive margin of first mover lying behavior during the current round. Again, 
we find that the stress treatment does not have a significant effect on the decision to send the largest possible 
lie. While our results from Table 4 showed that stress has a significantly negative influence on the extensive 
margin of lying, the results of Table 6 indicate that no such effect exists at the intensive margin of lying. 
That is, when participants decide to report a selfish black lie, socio-evaluative stress does not have a signif-
icant influence on the probability of reporting the largest possible lie.
Result II: At the intensive margin, socio-evaluative stress does not significantly influence the aver-
sion to reporting a selfish black lie.
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TABLE 6: PLAYER A’S DECISION TO LIE: INTENSIVE MARGIN
Probability of m = 6 if m > d Model I Model II
Coef. (Mar-
ginal Prob-
abilities)
Robust 
Std. Err.
P > |z|
Coef. (Mar-
ginal Prob-
abilities)
Robust 
Std. Err.
P > |z|
Coef. (Mar-
ginal Prob-
abilities)
Robust 
Std. Err.
P > |z|
Round 0.0107 0.0037 0.003 0.0056 0.0019 0.003 0.0055 0.0019 0.003
Die roll (d) 0.0288 0.0106 0.007 0.0256 0.0072 0.000 0.0258 0.0072 0.000
Stress -0.0106 0.1191 0.929 -0.0293 0.0703 0.677 -0.0306 0.0703 0.664
Age 0.0056 0.0108 0.605 0.0033 0.0068 0.628 0.0031 0.0069 0.653
Female -0.0604 0.1105 0.584 -0.0378 0.0651 0.561 -0.0355 0.0651 0.586
Performance 0.0022 0.0022 0.046 0.0022 0.0011 0.047
Avg. belief SecMo follows -0.1654 0.0820 0.044 -0.1666 0.0825 0.043
FirstMo reported  t-1 -0.0927 0.0216 0.000 -0.0872 0.0217 0.000m = 6 t-1 0.1831 0.0505 0.000 0.1858 0.0499 0.000
SecMo followed m t-1 -0.0049 0.0172 0.776
SecMo received lie t-1 -0.0150 0.0213 0.480
RANDOM EFFECTS PANEL PROBIT REGRESSIONS, STANDARD ERRORS ARE CORRECTED FOR CLUSTERING AT THE SUBJECT LEVEL. MODEL I: N = 2,416,
PSEUDO R2 = 0.107, LOG PSEUDOLIKELIHOOD = -581.5209, WALD 
 = 22.26, P < 0.001. MODEL II: N = 2,325, PSEUDO R2 = 0.200, LOG PSEUDOLIKELI-
HOOD = -465.8895, WALD 
 = 94.68, P < 0.001.MODEL III: N = 2,325, PSEUDO R2 = 0.201, LOG PSEUDOLIKELIHOOD = -465.4925, WALD 
 = 104.02, P 
< 0.001.
Decision to follow potentially harmful messages
FIGURE 5 TOP: AVERAGE PROBABILITY OF FOLLOWING A MESSAGE, BOTTOM: AVERAGE PROBABILITY OF FOLLOWING INCLUDING 95% CONFIDENCE 
INTERVALS—FOR EACH MESSAGE.
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The decision to follow a message can be interpreted as the decision of the second mover to trust that the 
first mover will not lie, meaning that the second mover’s decision-making environment includes strategic 
uncertainty. The literature has suggested that decision-making in these situations might be related to risky 
situations, i.e. situations bearing state uncertainty in which the outcome of one person cannot be due to 
another person (e.g. Cook and Cooper 2003, Hardin 2002, Karlan 2005). However, the brain seems to 
implement trusting decisions differently than risky decisions (Aimone et al. 2014, Kosfeld et al. 2005). In 
this vein, there is evidence that a person’s risk attitudes are not tightly connected to the decision to trust 
(Ben-Ner and Halldorsson 2010, Eckel and Wilson 2005, Houser et al. 2010). Nevertheless, we cannot rule 
out that this is also the case in our set-up. We are therefore not able to point out potential determinants of 
trust, which might relate to changes in risk aversion17, betrayal aversion (e.g. Aimone et al. 2014, Bohnet 
and Zeckhauser 2004), cognitive reflection (e.g. Corgnet et al. 2016), or even other factors. We leave this 
question open for future research.
As Figure 5 indicates, the effects of acute stress on the decision of a second mover to follow a message
do not seem to differ between treatments at the aggregate level. However, it appears that participants who 
experienced acute socio-evaluative stress are less likely to follow the messages 5 and 6. Chi-squared tests 
support this finding: We do not find significant differences in the willingness to follow the message 1-4
between our treatment and control group. For messages 5 and 6, this difference is significant (both p < 
0.001).
Model I of Table 7 includes the results of a binary response model that explains the second mover’s 
decision to follow the first mover’s message (1 = second mover follows, 0 = second mover does not follow).
It shows that trust increases significantly over the course of the game. We also see that second movers are
significantly less likely to follow the messages 4-6 (variable Message) than they are to follow a message of 
1. Stress does not have a significant influence on the decision to follow a message and neither do gender
nor age.
Model II additionally includes variables that represent previous round behavior of the second mover, as 
well as the second mover’s performance in the stress task. Most effects of Model I prevail. Model II shows 
that second movers are significantly less likely to follow the messages 5-6 than they are to follow a message 
of 1. Second Movers who followed a message during the previous round are significantly more likely to 
follow the message during the current round (SecMo followed t-1, 1 = second mover followed during the 
previous round, 0 = second mover did not follow during the previous round). Additionally, the model indi-
cates that second movers who received a lie during the previous round are significantly less likely to follow 
17 Cahlíková and Cingl (2017) and Kandasamy et al. (2014) show that stressed individuals exhibit a larger aversion to 
risk.
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a message during the current round (SecMo received lie t-1, 1 = second mover received a lie during the 
previous round, 0 = second mover did not receive a lie during the previous round).  
Result III: On average, socio-evaluative stress does not significantly influence the willingness to 
follow a message.
Model III of Table 7 allows us to check for treatment differences in trust regarding different messages as 
suggested by Figure 5. The results indicate that the willingness to follow a message no longer increases
over the course of the game. Unstressed participants are similarly likely to follow messages 2-5 as they are 
to follow a message of 1. However, a message of 6 is significantly less likely to be followed than a message 
of 1. Again, the treatment effect of our socio-evaluative stress intervention does not prove to be significant. 
As expected, treatment differences arise in the willingness to follow messages 5 and 6. We observe that 
participants in Stress are significantly less likely to follow messages 5 and 6 than they are to follow a 
message of 1. The other effects remain comparable to those reported in Model II.
Result IV: Participants under socio-evaluative stress are significantly less likely to follow high mes-
sages.
Contrary to our initial hypothesis, socio-evaluative stress does not have an effect on the aggregate level 
of trust. However, we do find that stressed participants are significantly less likely to follow high messages,
i.e. messages that can potentially include large lies. This lack of trust leads to missed payoff opportunities
in those cases where the high message equals the die roll. Therefore, second movers who underwent the 
socio-evaluative stress task earn significantly less in the lying game than the unstressed second movers.
This difference is statistically significant at p = 0.002 (U-Test).
In fact, following comes with a positive expected excess payoff for the second mover. The expected 
excess payoff is summarized in Table 8. The table reports the probability  with which each potential mes-
sage is true. The expected excess payoff from following a message is given as 10    3. Note that excess
expected payoff is significantly larger than 0 points for all potential messages. Since stressed first movers
tend to lie less than unstressed first movers, the expected excess payoff when interacting with a stressed 
first mover is even higher.
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TABLE 7: SECOND MOVER’S DECISION TO FOLLOW
Trust: Second mover follows Model I Model II Model III
Coef. (Mar-
ginal Prob-
abilities)
Std. Err. P > |z|
Coef. (Mar-
ginal Prob-
abilities)
Std. Err. P > |z| Coef. Std. Err. P > |z|
Round 0.0050 0.0011 0.000 0.0023 0.0009 0.014 0.0011 0.0010 0.266
Message
2 -0.0043 0.0073 0.555 -0.0046 0.0056 0.408 -0.0088 0.0076 0.247
3 0.0077 0.0060 0.204 0.0087 0.0062 0.163 0.0045 0.0073 0.543
4 -0.0240 0.0111 0.030 -0.0116 0.0107 0.277 -0.0044 0.0122 0.717
5 -0.0601 0.0141 0.000 -0.0227 0.0115 0.048 0.0014 0.0099 0.884
6 -0.2819 0.0267 0.000 -0.1319 0.0142 0.000 -0.1088 0.0185 0.000
Stress -0.0047 0.0173 0.786 0.0070 0.0111 0.530 0.0270 0.0186 0.147
Age 0.0017 0.0021 0.407 -0.0007 0.0016 0.678 -0.0007 0.0016 0.651
Female 0.0152 0.0178 0.394 0.0036 0.0134 0.788 0.0063 0.0139 0.647
Performance -0.0005 0.0004 0.238 -0.0004 0.0004 0.357
SecMo followed t-1 0.4525 0.0286 0.000 0.4963 0.0276 0.000
SecMo received lie t-1 -0.1069 0.0126 0.000 -0.1081 0.0139 0.000
Message x Stress
2 0.0088 0.0111 0.430
3 0.0041 0.0117 0.727
4 -0.0147 0.0200 0.461
5 -0.0542 0.0223 0.015
6 -0.0871 0.0281 0.002
Constant 0.5142 0.0515 0.000
MODEL I AND II: RANDOM EFFECTS PANEL PROBIT REGRESSIONS. MODEL III: RANDOM EFFECTS REGRESSION. STANDARD ERRORS CORRECTED FOR CLUS-
TERING AT THE SUBJECT LEVEL. MODEL I: N = 7,668, PSEUDO R2 = 0.096, LOG PSEUDOLIKELIHOOD = -2837.2466, WALD 
 = 253.98, P < 0.001. MODEL 
II: N = 7,242, PSEUDO R2 = 0.344, LOG PSEUDOLIKELIHOOD = -1888.516, WALD 
 = 652.66, P < 0.001. MODEL III: N = 7,242, R2 OVERALL = 0.371,
WALD 
 = 1403.74, P < 0.001.
TABLE 8: EXPECTED EXCESS PAYOFF FROM FOLLOWING
Probability that the message is true () Expected excess payoff from following a message
Message Overall Stressed first 
movers
Unstressed first 
movers
Overall Stressed first 
movers
Unstressed first 
movers
1 86.76% 87.43% 86.20% 5.68 5.74 5.62
2 85.78% 89.45% 82.66% 5.58 5.94 5.27
3 84.10% 88.64% 80.75% 5.41 5.86 5.07
4 79.31% 84.37% 75.73% 4.93 5.44 4.57
5 77.73% 76.82% 78.53% 4.77 4.68 4.85
6 43.22% 56.11% 36.61% 1.32 2.61 0.66
5. Conclusions
We propose a task to induce acute socio-evaluative stress in an economist’s lab. Our task is non-decep-
tive, features performance-based pay, simultaneously creates a treatment and control group, does not re-
quire an expert panel, and allows us to control for the influence of the performance in the stress task on 
future behavior. We show that our task is successful in inducing acute stress. 
Employing our stress task, we study the influence of acute socio-evaluative stress on the propensity to 
tell a selfish black lie (increasing own payoff at the expense of another player) and to trust messages that 
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could potentially contain a lie. This study is the first to provide evidence on lying with monetary conse-
quences after acute socio-evaluative stress. Our findings concerning the extensive margin of lying are in 
line with the results from hypothetical choices in moral dilemmas showing that acutely stressed individuals 
avoid harming others (e.g. Singer et al. 2017, Youssef et al. 2012). We show that individuals under acute 
socio-evaluative stress are significantly less likely to tell a selfish black lie. The participants of our stressed 
treatment group reduce lying at the extensive margin and show a significantly increased aversion to lying
compared to our control group. Concerning the intensive margin of lying, we do not find stress-related 
treatment differences. We further show that the decrease in the probability to lie at the extensive margin is 
not driven by a change in a player’s beliefs regarding the other players’ trusting behavior. Instead, it appears 
to be due to a change in distributional preferences. Our participants who underwent the social-stress inter-
vention make choices that are in line with heightened concerns for inequality aversion or maximin prefer-
ences, whereas the control group makes choices that are more often characterized by preferences for effi-
ciency, which correspond to self-interested payoff maximization in the lying game that we consider.
Concerning the decision to trust a message that potentially contains a lie, we find no aggregate effects of 
acute socio-evaluative stress on behavior. However, we do find that participants who underwent the stress 
task are significantly less likely to trust messages that can potentially include large lies. This reluctance to 
trust leads to missed payoff opportunities that are reflected in the earnings of the participants, as excess 
expected payoff from trusting a message is positive and substantial for all types of messages. 
Our findings suggest that acute socio-evaluative stress does not increase direct economic losses caused 
by lying behavior in business relationships. In fact, we would even expect these losses to decrease as the 
probability of telling a selfish black lie decreases under acute socio-evaluative stress. However, we do find 
support that an indirect cost may be imposed, as the reduction in trust can lead to missed business opportu-
nities. This may be especially problematic in relationships that are trust-based and characterized by incom-
plete contracts.
Note that the take-away from this study should not be to increase acutely stressful situations at the work-
place to keep deceptive behavior at bay. In fact, there is evidence of the adverse health effects of acute 
stress (e.g. Brotman et al. 2007, Steptoe et al. 2007) that can lead to reduced business outcomes (e.g. Burton 
et al. 1999, Goetzel et al. 2004). Instead, managerial implications refer to the fact that people under acute 
socio-evaluative stress may differ in what they think is ethically acceptable behavior and when they doubt 
the truthfulness of messages. Therefore, decision-making rights and monitoring efforts might have to be 
allocated carefully. In order to optimally do so, future research should focus on whether people adjust their 
lying and trusting decisions under reoccurring acute socio-evaluative stress, i.e. whether reoccurring acute 
socio-evaluative stress robustly influences decision-making, or whether people learn to cope with it.
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Appendix A - Instructions
Stress task—Instructions: Part 1
The experimental software will ask you questions concerning yourself, your character, and your emo-
tional state. Most of these can easily be answered by clicking on the answer with your computer mouse. 
Please answer quickly without taking too long to think—there are no right or wrong answers. Please read 
the instructions for each question as these concern different time frames (e.g. during the last month, during 
the last seven days, today).
Please note that your data will be stored in a pseudonymized format, i.e. your name is not stored together 
with your data. Instead of your name, a number is assigned. Third parties will not be able to find out that 
you participated in this study. The data analysis will also be carried out anonymously.
There will be a 10-minute break during the experiment. The software will let you know when. You will
receive €5.00 for your participation in this study. You can earn further payoffs during the course of the 
experiment. The experiment consists of two parts—A and B. You receive the corresponding instructions
before the start of each part.
In case anything is unclear to you, we are happy to come by your workstation to answer your questions.
Stress task—Instructions: Part 2
Part A of the experiment differs depending on the room you are located in. If you are in the room with 
the experimenter’s computer terminal, you belong to group 1. If you are in the other room, you belong to 
group 2.
Group 1:
Job descriptions often include requests for analytical thinking skills. Please imagine that you are applying 
for a position or a traineeship. Your task is to record a 2-minute video, in which you explain to what degree
you possess skills in analytical thinking. Before you start recording, you have 5 minutes to prepare your 
argumentation. Pens and paper are available at your workstation.
The software will let you know when you should put on your headset. Please position the microphone 
directly in front of your mouth and make sure the microphone is turned on.
As soon as the video application is loaded, immediately click the button “start recording” at the bottom 
right corner of your screen. The timer lets you know when the 2 minutes recording time are up. You may 
not repeat a recording.
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After the recording time for your video is over, the corresponding soundtrack is made available to the 
members of group 2. Each member of group 2 listens to each argumentation and evaluates its persuasive-
ness. The argumentation will be evaluated according to the criterion: “The person convincingly explained 
that they possess analytical thinking skills.”
The members of group 2 evaluate on a scale from 0% (not convincing at all) to 100% (very convincing). 
The better your evaluation as a group 1 member, the higher your payoff, which is derived from your median 
evaluation, i.e. each participant of group 2 evaluates your analytical thinking skills. The median is defined 
as:
  =   for an even number n of group 2 participants1/2 ! + " for an uneven number n of group 2 participants
Your payoff is derived from the following table:
0% #  # 10% 10% <  # 20% 20% <  # 30% 30% <  # 40% 40% <  # 50%
€1.00 €2.00 €3.00 €4.00 €5.00
50% <  # 60% 60% <  # 70% 70% <  # 80% 80% <  # 90% 90% < # 100%
€6.00 €7.00 €8.00 €9.00 €10.00
Example: You are not convincing in arguing you possess analytical thinking skills, and the median of 
your evaluation is 4%. You then receive a payoff of €1.00. If you are very convincing and the median of 
your analytical thinking skills is higher than 90%, you receive €10.00 during this part of the experiment.
Please do not state your name in the recording. Use the entire 2 minutes available for recording. You may 
not record for longer than that because the recording automatically stops after the 2 minutes are over. Should 
you be done with your argumentation before the 2 minutes are over, the software will continue to record. 
Please continue your argument instead of letting the time pass by.
Please note that participants of group 2 are also asked whether you tried to positively influence your 
payoff through ways that are not intended in the experiment. Group 2 participants are therefore asked to 
indicate whether “The person intentionally tried to influence me, so that I give a better evaluation.” If the 
majority (more than half) of the group 2 participants answer yes to this question, you will not receive a 
payoff from this part of the experiment, i.e. please do not send any private messages, collusive arrange-
ments, or the like.
After the entire experiment is over, you get to know your median evaluation. You receive your earnings 
in cash at the end of the experiment. Your total payoff includes your participation payment of €5.00 plus 
your earnings from part A and B of the experiment.
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Total payoff = €5.00 + Payoff Part A + Payoff Part B
Group 2
As a group 2 member, you also have 5 minutes of preparation time, during which you consider what 
makes a convincing presentation of analytical thinking skills. Pens and paper are available at your work-
station.
You receive the recordings of group 1, listen to them, and assess them on a scale from 0% (not convincing 
at all) to 100% (very convincing). The order in which you receive the recordings differs across group 2 
participants, i.e. the recording that one participant hears first, second, third... will be available to a different 
participant in a different order. After you evaluated one of the recordings, you cannot go back to adjust your 
evaluation. Please evaluate the recordings quickly, as the experiment is delayed otherwise.
Assessments are made according to the following criterion: “The person intentionally tried to influence 
me, so that I give a better evaluation,” “The person convincingly explained that they possess analytical
thinking skills,” “The person effectively used the 2 minutes available for recording.”
Your payoffs are based on your assessment in the category “analytical thinking.” You assess a total of 
i=5 participants from group 1. For every group 1 participant, a group median is calculated from the different 
assessments (see above). Your payoff is derived from the absolute value of the difference between your 
assessment of a group 1 participant and the respective participant’s group median: |   |
Example: You indicated that participant 2 of group 1 convinced you of his/her analytical thinking skills 
at a rate of 54%. The group median (including your own assessment) is 81%. The absolute difference be-
tween your assessment and the group median is 27 percentage points.
The closer your individual assessment is to the median group assessment, the higher your payoff. Your 
payoff can be derived from the following table:
0%-points# |   |# 2.5%-points 
2.5%-points< |   |# 5%-points 
5%-points< |   |# 7.5%-points 
7.5%-points< |   |# 10%-points 
10%-points< |   |# 12.5%-points €2.00 €1.80 €1.60 €1.40 €1.20 
12.5%-points< |   |# 15%-points 
15%-points< |   |# 17.5%-points 
17.5%-points< |   |# 20%-points 
20%-points< |   |# 22.5%-points |   |> 22.5%-points €1.00 €0.80 €0.60 €0.40 €0.20 
Example: If your assessment of person 3 in the category “analytical thinking” is farther than 25 percent-
age points from the median assessment, you receive €0.20. If your assessment differs by a maximum of 2.5
percentage points from the group median, you receive €2.00.
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Since you assess five persons from group 1, you can earn a maximum of €10.00 during this part of the 
experiment.
After the entire experiment is finished, you get to know the deviation of your five assessments from the 
five group medians. You receive your earnings in cash at the end of the experiment. Your total earnings 
amount to the participation payment of €5.00 plus your payoffs from part A and part B of the experiment.
Total payoff = €5.00 + payoff part A + payoff part B
Lying game—Instructions
Part B of the experiment
General information
 You are evenly split into two groups: participants of group A and participants of group B. The assign-
ment of the groups is completely independent of the group assignment during the last part of the ex-
periment. Only you know the group you belong to. The other participants are not informed about your 
group.
 The experiment lasts for 18 rounds. Your group remains unchanged during the entire time.
 During each round, the computer randomly matches pairs that consist of one group A participant and 
one group B participant. Overall, every group A participant will be matched with the same group B 
participant at least three times (and vice versa).
 The computer randomly assigns a number between 1 and 6 to each pair. Each number is similarly 
likely. During each round, no number will be assigned more than once. 
 In each pair, participant A sends participant B a message concerning the assigned number. Participant 
B does not see the actual number, but only the message participant A sent concerning the number. 
Participant B has to decide whether to follow participant A’s message. Further information is provided
below.
Decisions
 For every number that can possibly be assigned to the pair, participant A indicates the message he/she 
wants to send to participant B. This message can include every integer between (and including) 1 and 
6. The message does not have to equal the assigned number.
 Furthermore, participant A indicates whether he/she believes that participant B follows the message 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5 or 6.
The assigned number is: 1 2 3 4 5 6 Your message to participant B: The assigned number is: $ $ $ $ $ $        
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Assume that you send the following message to B... 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Do you believe that B will follow the message? oYes o No oYes oNo oYes oNo oYes oNo oYes oNo oYes oNo 
 Before participant B receives the message, he/she has to indicate for all potential messages whether 
he/she follows:
Message from participant A Your decision “The assigned number is 1” Follow      Do not follow “The assigned number is 2” Follow      Do not follow “The assigned number is 3” Follow      Do not follow “The assigned number is 4” Follow      Do not follow “The assigned number is 5” Follow      Do not follow “The assigned number is 6” Follow      Do not follow 
 According to the actually assigned number, the message from participant A is sent to participant B and 
the corresponding participant B decision is executed.
Payoffs
Participant A: 
 Participant A receives a payoff of 10 points plus twice the message sent (i.e. 12 points if participant A 
sends the message that the assigned number is 1, 14 points if participant A sends the message that the 
assigned number is 2, etc.): & = 10 + 2 × Message
 If, in more than 2/3 of the cases, participant A correctly estimates whether participant B follows the 
message, participant A receives an additional 50 points at the end of the experiment.
Participant B:
 If participant B follows the message sent by participant A, participant B receives a payoff of 10 points 
if the message equals the assigned number. Otherwise, participant B earns 0 points.
 If participant B does not follow the message, participant B receives 3 points:
' =   10 B follows the message and the message equals the assigned number                  0 B follows the message and the message does not equal the assigned number  
3 B does not follow the meassage                                                                        
Information
 At the end of each round, you will be informed about your pair’s results: you see the assigned number, 
the message participant A sent to participant B, B’s decision to follow, the payoff of participant A and 
participant B.
 You also see a table that contains the information mentioned above for all previous rounds.
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Earnings
 At the end of this part of the experiment, your points are converted into Euros at a rate of €1.00 per 25 
points. Your payoff will be paid out to you in cash together with your previous earnings at the end of 
the experiment (participation payment plus payoff from part A):
Total payoff = €5,00 + payoff part A + payoff part B
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Appendix B – Visual analogue scales (VAS)
Please indicate how you are feeling right now. Use the sliders to indicate to what degree you agree with 
the following statements. [Answers range from 0 to 100 percent]
 I am agitated
 I am scared
 I am happy
 I feel challenged
 I feel stressed
 I am proud of myself
 I feel in control of the situation
 I feel ashamed
 I am amused
TABLE 9: VAS II AND VAS III MEANS
Stress task only Stress task and lying game
VAS VAS II  
Males
VAS III 
Males
VAS II  
Males
VAS III 
Males
VAS II      
Females
VAS III     
Females
I am agitated
10.308 
(3.280)
28.077***  
(6.981)
15.086 
(3.867)
34.343***
(4.328)
14.944 
(3.063)
46.972***
(4.713)
I am scared
3.538 
(2.018) 
15.385*** 
(5.773)
9.829 
(3.081)
18.057***
(4.033)
2.528 
(1.150)
26.722***
(4.730)
I am happy
61.308 
(6.798) 
41.692**  
(6.820)
68.514 
(4.729)
44.029***
(5.444)
60.972 
(4.163)
34.333***
(4.795)
I feel challenged
8.462 
(2.544)
54.000 ***
(8.680)
26.457 
(4.817)
65.057***
(4.795)
37.000 
(5.023)
65.222***
(4.427)
I feel stressed
8.231 
(2.744)
31.538***
(8.005)
15.257 
(3.747)
41.714***
(4.985)
19.778 
(4.545)
50.139***
(5.008)
I am proud of myself
52.077 
(5.917)
47.923
(8.220)
58.000 
(5.464)
46.514*
(5.975)
44.250 
(4.673)
30.444***
(4.659)
I feel in control of the 
situation
69.308 
(7.587)
52.308** 
(7.330)
71.229 
(4.903)
55.857***
(4.863)
55.444 
(4.819)
38.056***
(4.112)
I feel ashamed
4.308 
(2.747)
13.231*
(5.323)
3.657 
(2.069)
13.514***
(3.314)
2.333 
(1.761)
22.944***
(5.032)
I am amused
27.538 
(6.668)
29.769
(8.328)
40.543 
(5.578)
30.829***
(4.834)
17.833 
(4.281)
8.944**
(2.098)
*** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1; SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES REFER TO INTRAGROUP VAS II – VAS III COMPARISONS BASED ON WILCOXON SIGNED-
RANK TESTS. ALL ANSWERS WERE GIVEN ON A SCALE OF 0 - 100%.
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Appendix C – Robustness checks
Regression results for pooled data including selfish black lies and spiteful black lies
TABLE 10: FIRST MOVER’S DECISION TO LIE: EXTENSIVE MARGIN-SELFISH BLACK LIES AND SPITEFUL BLACK LIES
Lying: First mover reports m > d Model I Model II Model IIICoef. (Mar-
ginal Proba-
bilities)
Robust 
Std. Err.
P > |z|
Coef. (Mar-
ginal Proba-
bilities)
Robust 
Std. Err.
P > |z|
Coef. (Mar-
ginal Proba-
bilities)
Robust 
Std. Err.
P > |z|
Round 0.0036 0.0018 0.046 0.0011 0.0015 0.472 0.0013 0.0016 0.420
Die roll (d) -0.0505 0.0083 0.000 -0.0389 0.0045 0.000 -0.0359 0.0043 0.000
Stress -0.1619 0.0720 0.024 -0.1057 0.0496 0.033 -0.1122 0.0523 0.032
Age -0.0167 0.0088 0.058 -0.0113 0.0054 0.036 -0.0122 0.0058 0.034
Female 0.0737 0.0752 0.327 0.0506 0.0505 0.317 0.0546 0.0540 0.312
Performance 0.0002 0.0011 0.870 0.0002 0.0012 0.828
Avg. belief SecMo follows -0.1914 0.0501 0.000 -0.1891 0.0525 0.000
FirstMo reported  t-1 0.3632 0.0500 0.000 0.3963 0.0481 0.000
SecMo followed m t-1 -0.0085 0.0191 0.654
SecMo received lie t-1 -0.0783 0.0219 0.000
RANDOM EFFECTS PANEL PROBIT REGRESSIONS. STANDARD ERRORS ARE CORRECTED FOR CLUSTERING AT THE SUBJECT LEVEL. MODEL I: N = 8,100,
PSEUDO R2 = 0.133, LOG PSEUDOLIKELIHOOD = -2799.0008, WALD 
 = 74.70, P < 0.001. MODEL II: N = 7,650, PSEUDO R2 = 0.330, LOG PSEUDOLIKELI-
HOOD = -2017.4634, WALD 
 = 191.71, P < 0.001. MODEL III: N = 7,650, PSEUDO R2 = 0.340, LOG PSEUDOLIKELIHOOD = -1988.0646, WALD 
 = 266.60,
P < 0.001.
Delayed evaluation treatment
The results reported below are based on data from a slightly altered form of the stress task. Performance 
evaluations were delayed to a later session, i.e. Control members did not evaluate the present Stress mem-
bers. Hence, we could rule out that Control members had information regarding the present Stress members 
that could affect beliefs regarding other player’s behavior in the lying game, social preferences, or the sense 
of group identity. The analysis is based on decisions from 14 stressed first movers and 16 unstressed first 
movers. The instructions and experimental procedures were identical to those described above, except for 
the fact that participants were made aware that Control members evaluate members of Stress who recorded 
their arguments in a previous session of the experiment. The corresponding part in the instructions was: 
[For Stress] “The members of group 2 who are present today will not evaluate your argument. The evalua-
tions will be obtained after today’s experiment. You will receive your payoff from this part of the experi-
ment at a later point in time together with the median assessment of your argument. Directly after today’s 
experiment, you will receive the participation payment of 5.00 Euros plus your payoff from part B of the 
experiment.” [For Control] “You will then receive the recordings from members of group 1 who recorded 
their arguments in another experiment. You will not hear the arguments from the members of group 1 who 
are present today. [...] You will receive your payoff from this part of the experiment at a later point in time 
together with an overview of your performance. Directly after today’s experiment, you will receive the 
43
participation payment of 5.00 Euros plus your payoff from part B of the experiment.” The results from this 
additional treatment support our findings reported in chapter 4, i.e. stressed first movers are significantly 
less likely to send a selfish black lie than unstressed first movers.
FIGURE 6: TOP: AVERAGE PROBABILITY OF TELLING A SELFISH BLACK LIE INCLUDING 95% CONFIDENCE BANDS, BOTTOM: AVERAGE PROBABILITY OF
SENDING A SELFISH BLACK LIE INCLUDING 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS—OVERALL AND FOR EACH DIE ROLL.
TABLE 10: FIRST MOVER’S DECISION TO LIE: EXTENSIVE MARGIN-SELFISH BLACK LIES AND SPITEFUL BLACK LIES – DELAYED EVALUATION TREATMENT
Lying: First mover reports  Model I: Selfish black lies Model II: All types of lies
Coef. (Marginal 
Probabilities)
Robust 
Std. Err.
P > |z|
Coef. (Marginal 
Probabilities)
Robust 
Std. Err.
P > |z|
Round 0.0042 0.0022 0.060 0.0027 0.0020 0.183
Die roll (d) -0.0893 0.0123 0.000 -0.0781 0.0125 0.000
Stress -0.1079 0.0328 0.001 -0.1305 0.0328 0.000
Age -0.0047 0.0091 0.601 -0.0034 0.0094 0.720
Female 0.1254 0.0770 0.103 0.1807 0.0723 0.012
RANDOM EFFECTS PANEL PROBIT REGRESSIONS. STANDARD ERRORS ARE CORRECTED FOR CLUSTERING AT THE SUBJECT LEVEL. MODEL I: N = 3,151,
PSEUDO R2 = 0.221, LOG PSEUDOLIKELIHOOD = -1291.7162, WALD 
 = 154.32, P < 0.001. MODEL II: N = 3,240, PSEUDO R2 = 0.181, LOG PSEUDOLIKE-
LIHOOD = -1458.5744, WALD 
 = 194.03, P < 0.001.
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